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Abstract 
 
The current study explores the investment performance of short-term investors known as flippers 
in the residential real estate market as well as the impact that flippers have on the housing 
market.  The study finds that investors who buy and then subsequently resell properties within a 
short period of time tend to generate returns in excess of the market by purchasing properties at a 
discount from distressed sellers.  Flippers purchase properties discounted an average of 7% in the 
market. This discount reflects the ability of flippers to identify underpriced properties which 
supports the information advantage story. When using all-cash purchases, the price is further 
discounted 12% and properties purchased at foreclosure are discounted an additional 20% for a 
total discount of 39%.  These investors use debt financing to further magnify the return on their 
properties. Flippers also have the ability to sell properties at a 5% premium even after controlling 
for equity, search costs, and home improvements. However, the realized excess price 
appreciation is inversely related to an investor’s time horizon with higher (lower) returns 
associated with shorter (longer) holding periods. As more flippers enter the housing market, the 
study finds that a higher number of foreclosures occur in neighborhoods that have a higher 
frequency of flipping activity.  Further, following the collapse of the housing market, flippers 
purchased properties at foreclosure and flipped them at a significant profit. In summary, flippers 
manage to earn positive excess returns both in hot and cold housing markets. 
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1 Introduction 
While the housing literature recognizes that both consumption and investment motives 
drive the acquisition of owner-occupied housing1 and the structure of consumer portfolios2, little 
is known about owners often called “flippers” who neither consume housing benefits nor capture 
these benefits via renting the house to others. For these owners, profit is the only motive for 
buying and then quickly reselling a house. In contrast to investors who plan to rent the home in 
the short run and then sell the home once a certain level of price appreciation is attained, flippers 
are analogous to speculators who provide liquidity to the market through taking advantage of 
asymmetrical information and/or deviations from fundamentals. 
The goal of this paper is to study the investment performance of flippers and their impact 
on the housing market.  More specifically, we examine several factors which account for the 
large returns that flippers experience including i) purchasing properties at a discount, ii) selling 
properties at a premium, iii) the impact of property improvements, in addition to iv) the housing 
market return factor using a repeat sales paradigm. Since these strategies are available to all 
individuals, not just flippers, we also explore additional market frictions that can result in 
discounts or premiums but restrict individuals from becoming flippers. These frictions include 
sufficient equity capital, access to financing, ability to use sweat equity (able to refurbish houses 
themselves), possessing an information advantage as well as better aligning incentives with 
agents. 
Using comprehensive house transaction level data from the Phoenix metropolitan area 
from 1988 through 2010, our analysis shows that flippers have a short term holding period with a 
4 month median and flippers realize a median, annualized price appreciation on their properties 
                                                            
1See Ranney (1981), Schwab (1982), Henderson and Ioannides (1983), Poterba (1984), Wheaton (1985), and Bosch, 
Morris, and Wyatt (1986) 
2See for example Brueckner (1997) 
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of 102%. Despite these large returns, only a small number of flippers are present in the Phoenix 
market. In fact, flippers make up less than 0.2% of all transactions. Although rising market prices 
do contribute to flipper profits, factors not related to market prices explain nearly twice the 
variation in property price appreciation.  The profits that flippers realize are partly due to 
purchasing properties at a 7% discount in the market with an additional 12% discount obtained 
for all-cash purchases, and a further 20% discount achieved when properties are purchased at 
foreclosure. The study also finds that flippers use debt financing to further magnify the return on 
their properties. On average, flipper returns increase four and a half times when leverage is used; 
the median return for flippers who use leverage is 159% compared to a 36% return for all-cash 
purchases. The presence of the 7% discount, which arises after controlling for financing (12% 
discount) and foreclosures (20% discount), suggests that flippers are able to identify and 
purchase mispriced properties, further increasing returns. The residual flipper discount is 
evidence that flippers possess an ability to identify mispriced houses in the marketplace which 
supports the informational advantage story.  After controlling for equity, search costs (mortgage 
payments) and property improvements, flippers are found to sell their properties at a premium.  
This premium is evidence that flippers are able to sell their properties at larger than expected 
prices, thereby increasing returns.   
Further, this residual flipper premium is evidence that flippers receive larger sale prices 
through either a superior matching ability (possibly associated with the actions of real estate 
agents) or decreased frictions associated with the principal-agent problem. However, the realized 
excess profit is inversely related to an investor’s time horizon; Higher (lower) returns are 
associated with shorter (longer) holding periods. As more flippers enter the housing market, the 
study finds that a higher number of foreclosures occur in neighborhoods that have a higher 
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frequency of flipping activity.  Following the collapse of the housing market, flippers purchase 
properties at foreclosure and flip them at a significant profit. Consequently, flippers manage to 
realize profits in excess of the market regardless of market conditions (hot or cold). 
The study proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides a literature review of the various 
components of housing returns and how these factors arise including those associated only with 
flippers due to market frictions. Section 3 presents a theoretical model using the models of 
Krainer (2001) and Krainer and LeRoy (2002) as our point of departure. This section also 
provides testable implications with a more detailed discussion of the first order conditions 
associated with our model found in Appendix A. A description of the data follows in Section 4 
while Section 5 sketches out the methodology used to explore flipper activity in the housing 
market. Section 6 reports the empirical results including the relationship between flipper activity 
and foreclosures within subdivisions and flipper performance in hot and cold markets. Section 7 
concludes.  
 
2 Literature Review 
 Although real estate is idiosyncratic in nature, there are factors common to all properties 
which affect individual prices.  Bailey, Mouth and Nourse (1963) and Case and Shiller (1989) 
describe house prices as a combination of a common market factor and an idiosyncratic term.  
Piazzesi and Schnieder (2009) develop a model where individual homeowners are able to trade 
on price momentum in the market.  These studies thus suggest that it is possible flippers are able 
to generate profits due to the market momentum.   
Case and Shiller (1989) use a repeat-sales regression (RSR) to estimate market prices for 
real estate.  Any discount or premium to the expected market price is captured by the error term 
in the RSR.  It is possible flippers generate returns by purchasing their properties at a discount. A 
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number of studies have documented a discount for properties purchased at foreclosure; in these 
studies the discount attributed to foreclosure is around 20%.3  In addition, the choice of financing 
used to purchase the house can also affect the sale price.  Asabere, Huffman and Mehdian (1992) 
and Forgery, Rutherford and VanBuskirk (1994) document houses purchased without financing 
sell at a 13.4% and 14% discount respectively.  Recently, The Wall Street Journal on February 8, 
2011 also reported on the use of all-cash financing by buyers to generate discounts for distressed 
properties.  Despite these discounts, foreclosure sales and all-cash purchases are discounts 
common to all individuals; it is not related to any ability to identify mispricing that only flippers 
might possess.   
Flippers can also generate returns by selling properties at a premium.  Previous studies 
have documented the relation between a homeowner’s equity in his current house and the 
required down payment for the purchase of his next house.  Stein (1995) develops a model where 
individuals choose listing prices based on the equity in their house.  Larger listing prices are 
associated with a lower probability of sale.  Individuals who require sale proceeds for a down 
payment on their next house will choose lower listing prices in order to capture the surplus from 
moving.  Genesove and Mayer (1997) also document a positive relationship between selling 
price and the loan-to-value ratio (LTV).   
A number of search models have been developed in which sellers search for buyers.  
These studies demonstrate how increasing search costs can lead to shorter search horizons and 
smaller prices.4  If flippers are able to secure loans with lower mortgage payments (or no 
mortgage payments at all) they will have reduced search costs and will thus be able to sell their 
                                                            
3 See Clauretie and Daneshvary (2009), Forger, Rutherford and VanBuskirt (1994), Springer (1996), Carroll, 
Clauretie and Neill (1997) and Pennington-Cross (2006). 
4 See Turnbull, Sirmans (1993), Krainer and LeRoy (2000), Krainer (2002), Lambson, McQueen, Slade (2004), 
Clauretie, Thistle (2007), Ihlanfeldt, Mayock (2010) 
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properties for larger prices.  These sources of premiums discussed above are common to all 
individuals in the real estate market.  Both flippers and non-flippers can have large equity stakes 
in their houses which will allow them to fish for larger prices.   
Additionally, it might be the case that the presence of a premium is not indicative of any 
characteristics of flippers, but instead related to changes in the property itself.  Case and Quigley 
(1991) discuss the impact that property improvements can have on a repeat-sales index.  Peek 
and Wilcox (1991) account for changes in house quality in order to estimate a constant-quality 
house price index.  It is commonly believed that flippers make property improvements after 
purchasing a property either through sweat equity5 or professional means.  If this is the case, 
properties which have been improved will be associated with increased prices.  Once again, all 
individuals, not just flippers, are allowed to make property improvements which can increase the 
value of these properties.   
Some factors which can produce discounts or premiums in the market can also preclude 
individuals from becoming flippers.  Down payments on houses can vary from 5% to 20% of the 
sale price.  On a $200,000 house, this translates into a $10,000 to $80,000 down payment.  This 
large initial investment can prevent individuals without adequate capital from flipping houses.  
Even if individuals are able to provide the initial investment but do require some financing, they 
will be forced to make mortgage payments until the property is sold.  Therefore, the total amount 
required for investment includes the down payment in addition to the present value of the 
mortgage payments.  Besides this, flippers might possess an informational advantage which 
allows them to identify mispriced houses.  Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) state investors will 
                                                            
5Sweat equity refers to homeowners who make value-added improvements to their home using their own efforts or 
“sweat”. 
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purchase information when it is optimal to do so; Kyle (1985) demonstrates how individuals with 
superior information can capture profits in the market.   
In addition to factors unique to flippers which allow them to purchase properties at a 
discount, there are certain features in the real estate market which might provide flippers with an 
advantage when selling their property.  Anglin and Arnott (1991) describe the principal-agent 
problem inherent in the real estate brokerage market.  Levill and Syverson (2008) find houses 
sold by real estate agents sell at a 3.7% premium.  If flippers are able to perfectly align the 
incentive of their real estate agent, or if they are real estate agents themselves, they will shift the 
equilibrium from an incentive-compatible equilibrium to a first-best equilibrium and capture 
some or all of the social surplus.   
In summary, the previous literature suggests that the observed returns that flippers realize 
could arise as the result of i) overall market momentum, ii) purchasing the property at a discount 
as the result of foreclosure or all-cash financing, iii) selling the property at a premium, and iv) 
property improvements that flippers make to the property. However, frictions can also exist 
which might not only limit the number of flippers in a given market but could also account for a 
portion of the returns that flippers realize. These barriers to entry include capital constraints, the 
costs of agency, holding, and search and an information advantage among others. 
 
3 Theory and Testable Implications 
Individuals selling their property face a tradeoff between the selling price and the 
probability of selling.  The larger the listing price, the longer the expected time until sale.  The 
risk-neutral seller must choose a sale price to maximize the present value of his house.  Formally, 
V(C) = max{P}{π(P)P + β(1- π(P))(V(C) – C)}   (1) 
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Here, V is the value of having the house on the market, P is the listing price, π(P) is the 
probability of sale as a function of P, β is the time discount factor and C is an individual-specific 
per-period holding cost of not selling the property.  Individuals who are forced to move into a 
new house because of personal, medical, occupational or other reasons must still make mortgage 
payments on the previous house until it is sold.  The variable C is designed to capture these costs. 
The probability of sale is determined from the buyer’s search problem.  As in Krainer 
(2001) and Krainer & LeRoy (2002), the buyer visits one house per period.  After visiting this 
house, the buyer sees the per-period flow of services that will be received in perpetuity and 
decides whether or not to purchase at the listed price, P.  This flow of services is distributed 
uniformly over the unit interval and captures the idiosyncratic valuation of residential real estate.  
For a given flow of services, ε, the value to the buyer of purchasing the house at price P is 
W(ε) = ε/(1-β) – P     (2) 
The buyer will purchase the property if W(ε) is positive.  For a given price, P, the probability the 
buyer will purchase the property is then 
π(P) = 1-P(1-β)     (3) 
The seller evaluates his probability of sale from this relationship.  The probability of sale is 
affine and decreasing in P. 
 The seller will solve equation (1) for the optimal choice of P, P*, taking (3) as given.  In 
the appendix, it is shown that P* is a decreasing function of C.  From the first order conditions, 
one can show that P* is a decreasing, linear function of C.  Further, the probability of sale, π(P*), 
is increasing in P*.  Sellers facing increasing holding costs will reduce their listing price which 
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will increase the probability of sale.  This lowered listing price provides an opportunity for 
flippers to purchase the property at a discount from the sellers who have large holding costs. 
 Flippers do not receive any flow of services from owning the property.  Once they 
purchase a property, flippers begin acting as sellers and solve the seller problem in (1).  Flippers 
are assumed to have no holding costs associated with the property, C=0.  In this setup, flippers 
will purchase the property if  
βV(0) – P>0      (4) 
The appendix shows there exists a cutoff holding cost, CL, with associated optimal price, P*(CL), 
such that βV(0)=P*(CL).  Flippers who see a listing price of P*(CL) in the market will purchase 
the property with positive expected profits.  However, non-flippers who view the house and do 
not perceive a large flow of services from the property will not purchase the property, even at 
P*(CL).  The large holding costs and the resulting low listing price create flipper discounts in the 
market. 
 Figure I displays the optimal price and probability of sale for various holding costs.  The 
optimal price declines as the holding costs increase.  The probability of sale also increases as the 
holding cost increases.  Figure II displays the discount for homeowners facing various holding 
costs.  Figure II also displays the expected time-on-market for various holding costs.  The time-
on-market decreases sharply before leveling off for larger holding costs.  Individuals who face 
larger holding costs will list their houses at reduced prices.  If flippers know the true market 
value of houses in the absence of holding costs, they can identify and purchase houses at a 
discount. 
 Flippers can also earn excess profits in the market by selling at a premium to market 
prices.  Previous research has discussed the principal agent problem which arises when real 
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estate agents enter into the selling process.  If flippers are able to provide incentives for real 
estate agents to steer clients towards their properties, they will be able to mitigate the agency 
costs.  In this setting, real estate agents who steer clients towards flipper properties will have a 
greater probability of matching.  This greater probability of matching is represented in the model 
by placing a lower bound on the flow of services received.6  The appendix shows P* is 
increasing in the lower bound for ε. 
 Figure III displays the optimal price and probability of sale for various lower bounds.  
The optimal price increases as the lower bound increases.  The probability of sale also increases 
as the lower bound increases.  With improved search technology, homeowners will not only sell 
their properties for larger prices but also sell their properties in a shorter amount of time.   
  Figure IV displays the premium and time-on-market for homeowners with improved 
search technology.  When individuals have improved search technology, they will receive a 
premium on the properties they sell.  However, equation (2) shows there is an upper bound on 
the price homeowners can charge for the property.  Because of this, the premium, as a percentage 
of the zero lower bound case, is also bounded from above. 
The maximum premium a flipper can obtain is less than 5% while flippers can purchase 
at a 6% discount with small holding costs.  Although the premium is bounded, as Figures III and 
IV show, the probability of sale increases dramatically and the expected time on market 
decreases as the lower bound on the flow of services increases.  With a lowered expected time on 
market, flippers who are financially constrained and require the sale proceeds for future down 
                                                            
6 Alternatively, real estate agents could show the house to N>1 potential buyers per period.  In this case, the 
probability of sale would be Pr(max{ε1,…,εN}<P(1-β)).  However, this is analogous to specifying an alternative 
distribution for the single buyer’s flow of services where the probability of being matched is greater than when only 
a single buyer views the property with flow of services drawn from the unit interval.   
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payments will be able to flip more properties over a given amount of time.  This becomes 
important with substantial all-cash discounts. 
The above results imply flippers will purchase properties at a discount in the market.  
This discount is a result of the seller’s holding costs for the property; these holding costs are not 
directly observed by flippers, but flippers are able to observe discounted prices as a result of 
these holding costs.  Further, the price flippers pay (discount) is expected to decrease (increase) 
as the seller’s holding costs increase.  When flippers have improved search technology, they are 
also expected to sell properties at a premium.  The excess returns flippers earn are expected to 
increase and the selling time is expected to decrease with this improved search technology. 
4 Data Description 
The data comes from the Maricopa County assessor’s office and includes transaction 
information on single-family houses sold in the Phoenix metro area.  There are over 1.8 million 
observations associated with real estate transactions between 1988 and 2010.  Each observation 
includes the transaction date, sale price, down payment, buyer and seller names, and geographic 
location of the property in addition to other information on property attributes and financing.   
For some observations, information fields are either partially missing or incorrectly 
entered.  To remove erroneous information, the data is screened with both data errors and 
econometrically leveraged observations - outliers7 - removed. Observations are econometrically 
leveraged if they have an abnormally large or small sale price, down payment or price 
appreciation which can influence regression results; it can be the case these econometrically 
                                                            
7 Outliers are properties with any sale above $10,000,000 and below $10,000.  Further, properties with annualized 
price appreciation more than 500% and less than -75% are removed.  Also, transactions where the down payment is 
more than the sale price are removed. 
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leveraged observations are data entry errors.  First, observations missing any or all information 
on transaction date, sale price, down payment, buyer and seller name, buyer and seller code or 
location are deleted. Note, because a RSR is employed, sale pairs must be formed taking into 
account deleted transactions. After deleting problematic observations, the 1.5 million 
observations which remain represent the cleaned data set. 
After cleaning the data, the next step is to identify flippers in the data.  Flip sales are 
defined as those sales in which a house is purchased by someone other than a bank, developer or 
government agency and subsequently sold within twelve months of purchase.8  There are 30,328 
identified flip sales in the cleaned data set.  These flip sales are used to identify flippers using the 
‘seller name’ field in the database.  However, not all trades within twelve months are made by 
flippers; some of these sales represent homeowners whose original intention was not to make a 
quick sale. These individuals are ex-post flippers in contrast to ex-ante flippers who intend to 
make a quick sale at the time of purchase; therefore, it is necessary to identify ex-ante flippers 
using additional information.  Seller names are used to aggregate the total number of sales by 
name.  Using information gathered from seller names, flippers are identified using two criteria: 
1) flippers must have executed 2 or more flip sales, and 2) more than 51% of total properties that 
a flipper purchases – total sales regardless of the eventual holding period – must be flip sales. 
There are 921 flippers identified using the abovementioned identification process. These flippers 
purchased and then resold 3,459 houses. 
Table I contains information on sale pairs; each sale pair is indexed by a first and second 
sale.  The sale pairs are divided into categories where the purchaser in the second sale is a flipper 
(Non-Flipper to Flipper), the seller in the first sale is a flipper (Flipper to Non-Flipper), the seller 
                                                            
8 Flip sales are defined by the holding period regardless of the individual selling the property.  Because of this, 
flippers can execute both flip sales and non-flip sales, and non-flippers can execute both flip sales and non-flip sales. 
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in the first sale purchased the property from a flipper (Following Purchase from Flipper) as well 
as all other sale pairs. 
This table shows 40.5% of all properties purchased by flippers are all-cash purchases and 
30.0% of the properties are purchased at foreclosure.  Also, individuals who sell to flippers have 
-12.3% in excess returns while flippers sell their properties with 14.4% in excess returns9.  These 
statistics and previous results in the literature suggest both all-cash and foreclosure purchases can 
produce positive excess returns.  In addition to excess returns, Table I shows the median 
annualized, predicted price appreciation was 27.4%, which is larger than the 6.4% in the typical 
sale-pair.  Thus, flippers also sold their houses during periods when the market was rising the 
fastest. In absolute terms, 90% of all properties sold by flippers had positive price appreciation 
with a median change in value of $37,708 over 4 months. 
Since flippers might make property improvements while they own the property, building 
permit data for property improvements is collected for the cities of Phoenix and Scottsdale to 
explicitly control for these improvements. A summary of the permit data is displayed in Table II 
and Table III.  The cities of Phoenix and Scottsdale are the only two cities with readily accessible 
building permit information. There are 10,083 total building permits which are matched to 
properties from the assessor’s office data.  Of these, 66 permits are for properties that flippers 
purchased. 
In addition to transaction information, the data from the assessor’s office also contains 
information on foreclosures. There are 181,551 recorded foreclosures between 1988 and 2010.  
These foreclosures are concentrated in the latter part of the sample with 21,180 foreclosures 
                                                            
9 Excess returns are in excess of the return on the repeat-sales index computed for the Phoenix metro area.  
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alone in the year 2008. These foreclosure sales represent 35% of the total number of sales during 
2010. 
5 Methodology 
 To determine the factors which influence discounts and premiums in the marketplace, a 
RSR is employed.  In the RSR, the seller buys the property at time t and sells the property to the 
buyer at time t+Δ.  The following model for the change in the log price of sale pair j is used 
Pjt+Δ – Pjt = α + Mjt+Δ – Mjt + Xjβ+ ej     (5) 
The model is similar in spirit to the Capital Asset Pricing (CAPM) model used to 
calculate Jensen’s alpha where alpha (the intercept term) in the current case is the estimated price 
appreciation in excess of the growth rate for prices in the overall housing market which we 
hereinafter refer to as excess price appreciation (EPA).  Given the large number of observations, 
the model is estimated using least squares, and standard errors are computed using the 
asymptotic methods in White (1980). 
The value Mjt+Δ – Mjt corresponds to the changes in the single-family house price index 
measured on a monthly basis.  These index values are estimated using a similar repeat sale 
procedure to that in Case and Shiller (1989).  In this setup, the difference in index values is 
analogous to a multi-period market return in the capital asset pricing model.  However, market 
returns are not observable and must be estimated.  Estimating equation (1) requires estimating 
the house price index - under the assumption of a unit loading on the market return - and other 
coefficients simultaneously. 
 Returns come from both market returns, Mjt+Δ – Mjt, as well as factors specific to the 
parties involved in the transaction.  The vector X contains dummy variables with information on 
the parties involved and the nature of the transaction.  Because the flippers are identified using 
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the holding period, it is necessary to control for holding period in the estimation process.  Not 
controlling for holding period could mistakenly associate the returns determined by holding 
period with the returns to flippers.  The variables One Year, Two Years, Three Years, Four Years 
and Five Years are determined by the holding period of all non-flippers.  The variable One Year 
is equal to zero if the buyer is selling the property within one year of purchase.  The other 
variables are defined in a similar manner.  With these holding period variables, the estimated 
index values are index values conditional on holding period. 
 To control for financing, an All Cash dummy variable is included which controls for all-
cash purchases.  If the seller purchased the property with all cash and the buyer did not, All Cash 
is equal to -1.  If the buyer purchased the property with all cash and the seller did not, All Cash is 
equal to 1.  If both parties purchased the property with all cash, All Cash is equal to zero.10  The 
coefficient on All Cash is expected to be negative. 
Foreclosure effects can also influence prices.  Because of this, three dummy variables are 
included which control for foreclosures: Foreclosure, Foreclosure5 and Foreclosure15.  The 
value of Foreclosure is computed in the same manner as the variable All Cash.  The variable 
Foreclsoure5 (Foreclosure15) is equal to one if the age of the house at the time of the second 
sale in the sale-pair is between 5 years and 15 years (more than 15 years) and zero otherwise.  
Foreclosure5 and Foreclosure15 are included to control for property deterioration associated 
with older properties.  Clauretie and Daneshvary (2009) find the condition of properties worsens 
and the discount associated with foreclosure increases as the age of the property increases.  They 
also find that when property condition is not taken into account, the estimated coefficient on 
foreclosure is one third larger.  Since both all-cash purchases and sales at foreclosure have been 
                                                            
10 Including the initial LTV did not change the estimation results. 
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found to lower the sale price in the prior literature, the signs on all of these coefficients are 
expected to be negative. 
To test for any discount that flippers receive when purchasing a property, the variable 
Flipper Discount is included.  This variable is equal to one if the buyer is a flipper and the seller 
is a non-flipper and is equal to zero otherwise.  The Flipper Discount coefficient measures any 
discount that flippers receive after controlling for financing and foreclosure sales.  To test the 
holding cost theory, the variables Flipper Discount90 and Flipper Discount95 are included.  The 
variable Flipper Discount90 (Flipper Discount95) is equal to one if the original LTV the seller 
used to purchase the house is between 0.90 and 0.95 (more than 0.95) and zero otherwise.  
Flipper Discount90 and Flipper Discount95 measure the additional discount flippers receive 
from sellers who are increasingly distressed.  Under the null hypothesis that flippers purchase 
properties from distressed sellers, and that this discount increases the more distressed the seller 
is, the coefficients on Flipper Discount, Flipper Discount90 and Flipper Discount95 are 
expected to be negative. 
 The variable Flipper Sale is included to control for properties sold by flippers.  This 
variable is equal to one if a flipper is selling the property to a non-flipper and is equal to zero 
otherwise.  Also, the variables Flip Sale6 and Flip Sale12 are included. The variable Flip Sale6 
(Flip Sale12) is equal to one if a flipper is selling the property to a non-flipper within 6 months 
of purchase (between 6 and 12 months of purchase) and is equal to zero otherwise.  It is not 
necessary that the identified flippers are pure flippers who purchase all properties intending to 
sell them quickly.  The variables Flip Sale6 and Flip Sale12 are intended to capture the EPA for 
those properties which flippers purchase and sell in a relatively short amount of time (this EPA is 
in addition to the one year EPA captured by One Year).  As shown above, with superior search 
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technology larger premiums are negatively correlated with the holding period.  Under the null 
hypothesis that flippers have a superior search technology, the coefficients on Flip Sale6 and 
Flip Sale12 are expected to be positive. 
 To test for any premium above market value that flippers receive requires looking at 
properties which are purchased from flippers and then resold.  If flippers sell the property above 
the predicted market price, then the individuals who purchase the property will sell their property 
at a discount upon resale; alternatively, the individuals who purchase this property on resale will 
receive a discount.  The variable Flipper Premium is included to test for any premium flippers 
charge when selling their properties.  This variable is equal to one if the seller had previously 
purchased the property from a flipper.  Under the null hypothesis that flippers charge a premium, 
the coefficient on Flipper Premium is expected to be negative. 
It may be the case flippers purchase a property, make improvements to the property and 
then sell the property.  The sale price would reflect these improvements; any estimated premium 
would capture the effects of the property improvements.  Building permit information is used to 
control for the change in property value.  The variable Remodel includes the log of the stated 
change in property value as reported on the building permit.  The coefficient for Remodel is 
expected to be positive and close to unity. 
 
6 Results 
The estimation results from equation (5) are displayed in Table IV.  In addition to the 
coefficient estimates, the associated percentage price increases are reported as in Halvorsen and 
Palmquist (1980).  The coefficients on One Year and Two Years are both positive and significant 
at the 1% level.  All properties sold within one year of purchase have an excess price 
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appreciation11 (EPA) of 6.88%, and those properties sold between one and two years after 
purchase have an EPA of 1.74%.  The remaining EPA for holding periods less than 5 years is not 
statistically significant.  Previous studies have documented both positive and negative 
relationships between the property’s time on market and the eventual selling price12, but our 
results show a definitive negative relation between homeowner holding period and sale price for 
the first two years of homeownership. 
Two possible explanations are offered for the EPA for non-flippers with one to two year 
holding periods.  The first explanation is related to the identification procedure used in the paper 
for flippers.  Individuals who flip only one property cannot be identified as flippers using the 
procedure above.  The coefficients on One Year and Two Years can be interpreted as the EPA for 
properties flipped by individuals who subsequently decide not to flip anymore.  These 
individuals stop because of reasons related to profits, expected profits or other reasons.  The 
positive coefficient on One Year suggests that those individuals who no longer continue to flip 
still earn positive EPA; however, the EPA captured by One Year and Two Years are less than the 
EPA for identified flippers. 
In addition to a robust measure of flipper EPA, the coefficients on One Year and Two 
Years can be associated with individuals who receive a flow of services from a house they 
purchase, and who also fish for potential buyers in the market.  Stein (1995) discusses how 
individuals with large loan balances will fish for large prices to capture benefits associated with 
moving. 
                                                            
11As previously stated, the excess price appreciation is the price appreciation in excess of the growth rate for prices 
in the overall housing market. 
12 Clauretie & Thistle (2009) contains a summary of previous results in the literature. 
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The coefficient estimates for all-cash and foreclosure purchases are also reported in Table 
IV.  All-cash purchases will receive a discount of 12.14%.  This discount is similar to the 13.4% 
reported in previous studies.  Flippers use all-cash financing 40% of the time in the data.  These 
all-cash purchases lower the price paid by flippers which provides them with a source of excess 
profit.   
The results further show that foreclosure purchases provide an additional source of excess 
return. Properties purchased at foreclosure which are less than 5 years old will sell for a 20% 
discount. The estimates for Foreclosure5 and Foreclosure15 indicate the foreclosure discount 
increases with the underlying property’s age; the foreclosure discount for older properties is 
large at 13.31%. When the property’s age acts as a proxy for property condition, the results are 
consistent with Clauretie and Daneshvary (2009). The additional discount for older properties in 
foreclosure is attributed to a deteriorated property condition; the 20% discount for newer 
foreclosed properties should be interpreted as the discount for properties in good condition which 
are sold at foreclosure.  Of the 618 foreclosure purchases by flippers, 93 properties are less than 
5 years old and 406 properties are more than 15 years old.  
After controlling for all-cash and foreclosure factors, the coefficient on Flipper Discount 
indicates that flippers still purchase properties at a 7.71% discount.  The magnitude of the 
unconditional discount for flippers is slightly less than the all-cash discount.  This discount is 
evidence that flippers are able to identify underpriced properties in the market.  Although all-
cash purchases and foreclosure purchases can augment excess price appreciation for flippers, it is 
not necessary flippers use these methods to produce EPA.  However, the results in Table IV 
indicate that the discount flippers receive increase when the individuals selling to flippers 
purchase their properties with larger LTV ratios.  Individuals who purchase their house with a 
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LTV greater than 0.95 sell to flippers at a 8.83% discount which is in addition to the 
unconditional 7.72% discount.  Further, this EPA for flippers selling within one year is in 
addition to the 6.88% premium for all houses sold within one year after purchase. 
There is evidence that properties sold by flippers have positive EPA.  Table IV shows 
that the unconditional EPA for flippers is insignificant at the 10% confidence level.  However, 
the EPA for flippers who sell their properties in less than 6 months is 16.03%.  The excess price 
appreciation is 10.45% for properties that flippers sold between 6 months and 12 months after 
purchase.  From the theory above, the larger EPA associated with shorter holding period can be 
associated with improved search technology. 
Table IV presents additional evidence that individuals who purchase properties from 
flippers will subsequently sell these properties at prices below market value.  The coefficient on 
Flipper Premium is -4.86%.  This value indicates individuals who purchase properties from 
flippers will then experience a 4.86% discount when selling the property.  This discount can be 
significant when the purchaser uses a large LTV ratio.  The next section discusses the impact this 
can have on foreclosures. 
It is conceivable that flippers make significant improvements to the properties they 
purchase.  To control for this, building permit information is obtained for the cities of Scottsdale 
and Phoenix.  This permit data contains information on the assessed increase in property value 
from the county assessor as the result of these improvements.  The assessed increase in property 
value is added to the vector X in equation (5).  With this information, equation (5) is estimated 
using only sale-pairs from the cities of Scottsdale and Phoenix.  The estimation results are 
reported in Table V.  The Remodel coefficient is positive but not close to unity.  Furthermore, the 
signs on all of the other coefficients are the same as the signs on the coefficients in Table IV.  
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This supports the hypothesis that flipper profits remain after controlling for property 
improvements. 
The results in Tables IV and V display the returns in the absence of transaction costs.  
However, individuals who purchase and sell properties must pay a real estate agent commission.  
Commissions are paid to the real estate agent and can range from 4% to 6%; with the buyer and 
seller often splitting the commission.  The results in Table IV indicate flippers selling within one 
year continue to have a positive EPA when subtracting 6% for the real estate agent commission.  
Further, the data in Table I show the median profits for flippers are $34,445 after subtracting a 
6% real estate commission. 
 
Foreclosures and Flipping 
 
This section documents that a positive relationship exists between flipper activity and 
foreclosures within subdivisions. Using subdivisions as a geographic identifier is more precise 
than using zip codes. Dispersion in homeowner attributes including income, wealth and 
preferences can be large within zip codes but is much smaller at the subdivision level. Further, 
the attributes of houses are typically more homogeneous within a subdivision in general. 
The preceding analysis evidences that properties purchased from flippers are bought at a 
premium to the market value.  This premium reduces the equity individuals believe they have in 
their houses.  The initial equity an individual has in a house purchased for price P is equal to (1-
LTV)P.  If the homeowner sells his house immediately, P would decline by 4.86% but the loan 
balance would not. Therefore the actual equity is (0.9514 – LTV)P.  The equity is therefore 
reduced; if the LTV is more than 0.9514, the homeowner will have negative equity. To the extent 
foreclosure is related to negative equity, there will be a positive relationship between 
foreclosures and flipping activity. 
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 The data used includes observations on subdivisions including the number of houses, 
housing turnover and flipper sales within subdivisions between 2004 and 2009. The observation 
units are subdivisions. Due to a lack of trading activity, subdivisions with less than ten houses 
are excluded. This results in 11,939 subdivisions remaining with a total of 738,314 houses.  
There are a total of 3,056 flipper purchases within these subdivisions over the time period. A 
total of 70,155 foreclosures are recorded in these subdivisions. The sales are divided into two 
time periods: before 2006 and after 2006. These correspond approximately to time periods prior 
to and subsequent to the peak of the housing bubble. 
 The first way to model the relationship between the number of foreclosures per 
subdivision and flipper activity per subdivision is with a Poisson distribution. The Poisson 
distribution has previously been used to model foreclosures and defaults (see for example  
Ambrose, Capone and Deng (2001) and Longstaff, Mithal and Neis  (2006)). Specifically, the 
density function for the number of foreclosures in subdivision i, yi, is given by 
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(6) 
The variable i  is defined as 
ln i ix                                                              (7) 
The vector xi contains a constant and covariates. These covariates include the number of houses 
in subdivision i, the number of houses in subdivision i squared, the turnover13 of housing in 
subdivision i, the number sales by flippers in subdivision i and the median home price in 
subdivision i between 2004 and 2006. The parameter vector β, particularly the coefficient for 
                                                            
13 Turnover is defined as the total number of sales in subdivision i between 2004 and 2006 divided by the total 
number of houses in subdivision i. 
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flipper sales, is of interest. A positive value on the coefficient for flipper sales indicates a 
positive co-movement between the number of flipper sales and the expected number of 
foreclosures. 
The estimated coefficients for equation (6) are listed in the ‘Poisson’ column of Table VI. 
The values for the coefficients represent the expected percent change in the number of 
foreclosures for a one unit increase in the variable. Each additional flipper transaction increases 
the expected number of foreclosures by 14.5%. The median number of expected foreclosures 
from the Poisson model is 3.094. At this level, the marginal increase in expected foreclosures 
from an additional flipper sale is 0.45.   
 A second method to model the number of foreclosures is to use the negative binomial 
model of Cameron and Trivedi (1986). In the data, there are a large number of subdivisions with 
zero foreclosures; in general, the Poisson distribution does not support a large probability of zero 
foreclosures.  The negative binomial distribution uses two parameters for the mean and variance 
of the distribution which can allow for a large number of zero observations; the standard Poisson 
distribution requires that the mean and variance are identical. The conditional mean for each 
observation is modeled using 
                    
   ln ln  i i i ix u  
                                      
 (8) 
The variable ln(ui) is a subdivision specific effect which shifts the conditional mean of the 
subdivision. This individual effect allows for differences in the mean and variance of the 
distribution providing for a larger percentage of zero observations.   
The impact of flipper activity on the number of foreclosures using the negative binomial 
distribution is similar to their impact when the Poisson distribution is used. The estimated 
coefficients in (8) are listed in the ‘Negative Binomial’ column of Table VI. Each additional 
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flipper purchase increases the expected number of foreclosures by 18.1%. The median number of 
expected foreclosures from the negative binomial model is 2.83. Using this number of expected 
foreclosures, the expected increase from one more flipper purchase is 0.51.   
 A final way to model the relationship between the number of foreclosures per subdivision 
and the number of flipped houses in a subdivision is to use a zero-inflated Poisson distribution as 
described in Lambert (1992). The zero-inflated Poisson distribution differs from the typical 
Poisson distribution in that there is a certain probability ψ that the number of foreclosures will be 
zero with certainty; with probability 1-ψ, the number of foreclosures is drawn from a Poisson 
distribution.  Specifically, the Poisson distribution has density 
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(9) 
Here yi is the number of foreclosures in subdivision i .  The variable λi is defined as 
ln i ix                                                            (10) 
 As previously mentioned, the probability of a subdivision having zero foreclosures with 
certainty is equal to ψ.  The probability ψ is modeled using the following logit function. 
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                 (11) 
The variables in xi are the same as above. Here, the logit model predicts the probability of 
a neighborhood having zero foreclosures with certainty given the covariates. One can classify a 
neighborhood into two groups: prone to foreclosures and the type not prone to foreclosures. The 
probability of a neighborhood not prone to foreclosures is ψ. Neighborhoods have no 
foreclosures if they are more stable; the variables in xi provide a measure of this stability. 
25 
 
The parameters in (9) and (10) are estimated using maximum-likelihood methods. The 
estimated coefficients are reported in the column labeled ‘Zero-Inflated Poisson’ in Table VI.  
The estimation results indicate the number of flipper sales is positively related to the number of 
foreclosures in a particular neighborhood. The increase in the expected number of foreclosures is 
related to the expected number of foreclosures in neighborhood i multiplied by the parameter of 
interest. Each additional flipper sale increases the expected number of foreclosures by 13.4%.  
The median expected number of foreclosures for all neighborhoods is 3.12 foreclosures per 
neighborhood. At this median number of foreclosures, the change in the expected number of 
foreclosures given one additional flipped house is 0.41. 
The parameters for the logit model provide additional information on the relationship 
between flip sales and foreclosures. The estimated coefficients for equation (9) are reported in 
the ‘logit’ column in Table VI. The estimated coefficients indicate that each additional flipper 
sale decreases the probability of being a neighborhood not prone to foreclosures by a factor of 
0.614.  Therefore, the probability of a subdivision having more than one foreclosure increases 
greatly when there is flipper activity in the subdivision.  
 
Price Appreciation and Return on Equity 
 Flippers purchase houses for financial gain.  Price appreciation represents one way to 
measure this gain. A house price index is designed to track the price appreciation for generic 
properties by the purchase and sale dates.  An alternative measure of financial gain is the return 
on equity (ROE).  The amount of initial equity a homeowner has in his house is the initial down 
payment plus closing costs.  If flippers work with a real estate agent, a 4-6% commission will be 
paid.  The ROE is equal to the net income from the investment in the property divided by the 
                                                            
14 Exp(-0.9242) = 0.6031 
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initial equity position in the investment.  For a house purchased at time 1 for price 1P  and sold at 
time 2 for price 2P , the ROE is calculated as 
                 
 2 1 1   P P P DP rROE
DP
                                                 (12) 
Here, DP is the down payment, or equity, in the investment and r  is the interest rate on the 
mortgage. Equation (12) can also be written in term of price appreciation (PA) and the loan-to-
value ratio (LTV) 
      1 1
  
PA LTVROE r
LTV LTV
                                                  (13) 
From equation (13), it is clear that the amount of leverage used can have a significant 
impact on the ROE. When there is no borrowing (all-cash), the LTV is equal to zero, and the 
ROE will equal the price appreciation; in the absence of borrowing, the term including r  in 
equation (13) disappears because there are no mortgage payments. Because the gain from price 
appreciation is based on the original price of the house and not the original amount of equity, the 
ROE remains positive when the price appreciation is equal to the mortgage rate. Consequently, 
flippers who use all-cash purchases receive price discounts which can increase the expected price 
appreciation.  However, the use of all-cash purchases eliminates any leverage effect in the ROE. 
 Table VII shows the median gross price appreciation for flippers is 35.38%.  Assuming 
an interest rate of 6%, the median ROE for flippers is 36.65%.  The all-cash discount present in 
the market suggests there is a tradeoff between leverage and price appreciation; flippers will 
decrease leverage if they are able to purchase at a discount and increase expected price 
appreciation.  Table VII also shows price appreciation tends to decrease as the amount of 
leverage increases.  However, the ROE for flippers increases as the leverage increases.  Thus, 
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from a ROE perspective, the use of leverage increases ROE more than any discount from all-
cash purchases.   
However, flippers using mortgage financing are subject to certain frictions. Flippers who 
require financing will only be able to flip properties if they can secure financing.  Lender 
approval can delay or even negate the transaction.  Because of this, flippers who use all-cash 
financing will be able to more quickly purchase all properties they identify as sufficiently 
discounted.  Therefore, the above results for flippers who use financing are conditional on 
financing approval.  
 
Flipper Performance in Hot and Cold Markets 
Flippers purchased the majority of their houses prior to 2006.  Table VIII shows the total 
number of flipper purchases by year.  The years before 2006 mark a period of rising house 
prices.  During this time period, flippers earned their lowest excess returns.  To estimate excess 
returns, equation (1) is re-estimated with the dummy variables in X as well as additional dummy 
variables controlling for the year that flippers purchased the property.  The estimation results for 
the year of purchase coefficients are reported in Table IX.  The results in Table IX reveal that 
during the years 2003 to 2005, the unconditional EPA for flippers was either negative or not 
statistically different form zero.  Further, Table VIII shows that flippers did not purchase a large 
number of foreclosures during this period. 
 Following the peak of the housing market in 2006, flippers temporarily reduced their 
purchases. With the collapse of the housing market in 2007 and continuing into 2008, flippers 
were still able to identify mispriced houses. The Case-Shiller house price index for Phoenix 
decreased 18% between January 2007 and January 2008 and further declined 35% between 
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January 2008 and January 2009. However, Table VIII shows the median price appreciation for 
flippers was positive during these time periods.  Table IX shows that flippers who bought 
properties realized excess returns of 15%, 21% and 16% when purchasing in 2007, 2008 and 
2009 respectively.   
Table VIII also shows that starting in 2007 and continuing through 2009, flippers began 
to increase their purchases of properties at foreclosure. Table IX shows flippers purchasing 
properties and reselling them within one year had excess returns of 15%, 21% and 17% in 2007, 
2008 and 2009 respectively. With the housing market crash in 2007, flippers remained in the 
market but switched their trading strategy.  Flippers increased their purchases of foreclosed 
properties making significant returns on these purchases.  Tables VIII and IX reveal that flippers 
were able to earn positive returns in excess of the market by switching the type of properties they 
purchase. 
 
7 Conclusion 
 This paper builds on previous research describing different of types of individuals buying 
and selling houses. There is evidence that flippers enjoyed positive returns upwards of 33% in 
excess of the appreciation in the overall housing market.  These returns can arise from either 
property selection ability or from fishing for larger prices. These returns are a combination of 
buying at a discount and selling at a premium.  Absent all-cash financing and foreclosure 
purchases, flippers purchase at a 7.7% discount which increases to 16.5% discount if the 
individual selling to the flipper used a LTV greater than 0.95 to purchase the home.  The 7.7% 
discount reflects the ability of flippers to identify underpriced properties which supports the 
information advantage story. Flippers are also able to take actions which can generate discounts.  
Using all-cash financing will create a discount of 12.1%. Also, flippers can purchase a property 
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at foreclosure which provides an additional 20% discount.  These excess return results continue 
to hold after controlling for property improvements.   
 The study also documents that flippers have a significant impact on the overall housing 
market. The number of sales by flippers in the market is directly related to the number of 
foreclosures in a given subdivision. When neighborhoods are characterized as either stable with 
no probability of foreclosure or unstable with a positive probability of foreclosure, each 
additional flipper transaction decreases the probability of a community falling into the stable 
neighborhood category by a factor of 0.6. 
 The use of financing is important for flippers.  Flippers who use all-cash financing 
receive a discount which increases price appreciation.  However, flippers who use leverage 
magnify their return on equity (ROE).  The median ROE for flippers who use leverage is 158.7% 
which is four and a half times larger than the 35.8% ROE for all-cash purchases.  A tradeoff thus 
exists between leverage and price appreciation that arises due to the all-cash discount. 
 Further, there is evidence that flippers are able to earn excess returns in both hot and cold 
markets.  When markets are hot, flippers tend to avoid foreclosure properties in earning positive 
excess returns.  However, when markets are cold, flippers purchase more properties at 
foreclosure.  The excess returns for purchasing foreclosure properties are significantly positive 
and provide flippers with an additional 10% in excess returns.  
          In summary, flippers are able to earn excess returns even in cold markets through changing 
their tactics to focus more on foreclosure transactions.  Although the trading strategy differs in 
hot and cold markets, flippers manage to earn positive excess returns in both situations. 
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Appendix 
 
Claim 1: P* is a decreasing function of C 
First, the value function is non-increasing in C.  Let P2 and P1 be the prices which maximize 
equation (1) for C2 > C1.  Substituting P2 and P1 into (1) and solving for V(C2) and V(C1) 
 
V(C1) = [1–β + βπ(P1)]-1[π(P1)P1 - [1-π(P1)]βC1] 
≥ [1–β + βπ(P2)]-1[π(P2) P2 - [1-π(P2)]βC1] 
≥ [1–β + βπ(P2)]-1[π(P2) P2 - [1-π(P2)]βC2] (the strict inequality holds only if 1-π(P2) > 0, but we 
have that 1-π(P2) ≥ 0) 
= V(C2) 
The first inequality follows because P2 is not optimal given C1.  The second inequality is a result 
of C2 > C1 and 1-π(P2) ≥ 0.  The last line uses the definition of V(C2). 
 
From the first order conditions 
1 + β[1-β][V(C) - C] = 2(1-β)P*    (A1)   
Since V(C) is non-increasing in C, the left-hand side is decreasing in C.  This implies the right-
hand side is decreasing in C which proves P* is decreasing in C. QED 
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Claim 2: There exists a cutoff holding cost, CL, with associated optimal price, P*(CL), such that 
βV(0)=P*(CL).   
 
The first step is to show that there exists an optimal price which is above βV(0).  The second step 
is to show that there is a CMAX  such that βV(0) > P*(CMAX).  Using the result that P*(C) is 
decreasing and continuous; the intermediate value theorem can be applied. 
 
First, solving equation (1) in terms of V(0) with the optimal choice of P0 
βV(0) = β[1-β+ βπ(P0)]-1π(P0)P0 
< [1 + β(1 - π(P0))]-1π(P0)P0 
≤ P0 
The first inequality follows because β < 1.  The second inequality is because π(P0) ≤ 1 and 1 + 
β(1 - π(P0)) ≥ 1.  Thus, when C=0, βV(0) is below P0. 
 
Next, suppose P* > 0 for all C > 0.  By equation (A1), this can only be true if V(C) is increasing 
after some point.  However, we have already shown V(C) is non-increasing.  Therefore, it must 
be the case that P*(C) = 0 for all C > CMAX.  We also have, V(0) ≥ V(CMAX) = 0.  Substituting 
equation (3) into equation (1) shows that the objective function is strictly concave.  By Lemma 
3.7 in Stokey, Lucas and Prescott, the price function is continuous in C.  By the intermediate 
value theorem, there exists a CL such that  βV(0) = P*(CL).  QED 
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Claim 3: P* is increasing in the lower bound for ε 
 
When a non-zero lower bound is placed on the buyer valuations, the value function for the sellers 
is modified.  The probability of sale is λ(E) = (1-E)-1[1 – P(1-β)] = (1-E)-1π(P).  The value 
function for individuals with a lower bound of E on the valuations potential buyers arrive with is 
 V(E) = max{P} λ(E)P + [1- λ(E)]βV(E)   (A2) 
From the first order conditions 
1 + (1-β)βV(E) = 2(1-β)P*    (A3) 
If V is increasing in E, then P* is increasing in E.  Given a lower bound for the distribution, 0 < 
E < 1, the value function obeys the following relationship for optimal price P*.   
V(E) = [1–β + βλ(E)]-1λ(E)P*    (A4) 
Using (A4) 
V(E) = [1–β + βλ(E)]-1λ(E)P* 
= [(1-E)-1(1-E)(1-β) + β(1-E)-1π(P*)]-1(1-E)-1π(P*)P* 
= [(1-E)(1-β) + βπ(P*)]-1π(P*)P* 
Thus, V(E) is increasing in E.  From (A3), P* is increasing in E. QED. 
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Figure I 
The optimal sale price and the probability of sale are displayed for various holding costs.  The 
sale price is computed by maximizing equation (1).  The probability of sale is computed using 
equation (3) with the optimal sale price chosen using equation (1).  Holding costs represent the 
cost to the homeowner of holding on to the property into the next period.  The time period 
corresponds to one month. 
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Figure II 
The discount to the zero holding cost price and the time-on-market are displayed.  First, optimal 
sales costs are computed using various holding costs.  Then, these prices are expressed as 
percentage discounts relative to the optimal price when there are zero holding costs.  Time-on-
market is computed as the expected number of periods before a sale is made.  The time period 
corresponds to one month. 
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Figure III 
The optimal sale price and the probability of sale are displayed for various lower bounds in the 
distribution of the flow of services to buyers.  The sale price is computed by maximizing 
equation (1).  The probability of sale is computed using equation (3) - conditional on all flows of 
services being above the specified lower bound - with the optimal sale price chosen using 
equation (1).  Lower bounds represent an unconditional increased probability of buyers receiving 
large flows of services from the property.  The time period corresponds to one month. 
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Figure IV 
The premium to the zero-bound price and the time-on-market are displayed.  First, optimal sales 
costs are computed using various bounds.  Then, these prices are expressed as percentage 
discounts relative to the optimal price when the lower bound is zero.  Time-on-market is 
computed as the expected number of periods before a sale is made.  The time period corresponds 
to one month. 
 
 
  
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
20
0.0%
1.0%
2.0%
3.0%
4.0%
5.0%
6.0%
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9
M
on
th
s
Pr
em
iu
m
Lower Bound
Premium to the Zero Bound Price and 
Time on Market
Premium Time on Market
40 
 
Table I 
Statistics for the Transactions Before and After Flipper Transactions 
This table contains information on sale pairs; each sale pair is indexed by a first and second sale.  
The sale pairs are divided into categories where the purchaser in the second sale is a flipper 
(Non-Flipper to Flipper), the seller in the first sale is a flipper (Flipper to Non-Flipper), the seller 
in the first sale purchased the property from a flipper (Following Purchase from Flipper) as well 
as all other sale pairs.  The statistics include number of sale pairs, percentage of sale pairs where 
the seller in the first sale purchased the house without financing (All-Cash Sales in First Sale), 
the seller in the second sale purchased the house at foreclosure(Foreclosure Sale), median and 
standard deviation return on equity (ROE), actual price appreciation (PA), predicted price 
appreciation using the change in the repeat-sales index (Predicted PA), returns in excess of the 
change in the repeat-sales index (Excess Return), actual change in the property value and number 
of months the seller in the first sale held the property. 
  
Non-Flipper 
to Flipper 
Flipper to 
Non-Flipper 
Following 
Purchase 
from Flipper 
All Other 
Sale Pairs 
Observations 2,055 2,477 615 536,540 
All-Cash Sales in First Sale 6.3% 40.5% 4.2% 9.0% 
Foreclosure Sale 30.0% 2.5% 32.9% 12.2% 
Median ROE 49.7% 36.65% 15.8% 147.5% 
Median PA 14.6% 35.4% 6.3% 28.0% 
Standard Deviation PA 64.6% 39.8% 52.7% 53.6% 
Median Annualized PA 3.6% 103.0% 2.7% 6.4% 
Median Predicted PA 24.4% 7.7% 12.1% 23.8% 
Median Annualized Predicted PA 6.2% 27.4% 6.4% 6.4% 
Median Excess Return -12.3% 14.4% -5.0% -1.1% 
Standard Deviation Excess Return 30.2% 27.4% 26.1% 22.2% 
Median Change in Property Value $18,483.1 $37,708.2 $11,269.7 $36,680.7 
Standard Deviation  
Change in Property Value 
$110,315.4 $52,197.1 $125,649.6 $115,492.6 
Median Months Held 49.6 4.0 34.0 44.6 
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Table II 
Total Number of Permits for Non-Flippers and Flippers 
The number of building permits and the number of flip sales with permit information.  There are 
102 total flip sales with matched building permit information.   
 Total Permits Permits for Flip Sales 
City Count Percentage of Total Count Percentage of Total 
Phoenix 9,322 92.45% 60 90.90% 
Scottsdale 761 7.54% 6 9.09% 
Total 10,083 100.00% 66 100.00% 
 
Table III 
Increase in Property Value arising from Capital Improvements 
The increase in property value as the result of building permit information on capital 
expenditures (property improvements) for the house is reported in this table. The mean % of 
purchase price and median % of purchase price measure the percentage improvement in property 
value based upon the purchase price before the permit issue date.  The mean level increase and 
median level increase measure the dollar amount of capital expenditure stated in the building 
permit. 
City 
Mean % of 
Purchase Price 
Median % of 
Purchase Price 
Mean Level 
Increase 
Median 
Level 
Increase 
Phoenix Non-Flip 24.1% 9.4% $31,106 $12,615 
Scottsdale Non-Flip 24.5% 12.5% $59,564 $30,120 
Phoenix Flip 17.8% 12.1% $17,631 $11,813 
Scottsdale Flip 5.0% 2.2% $17,132 $6,175 
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Table IV 
Estimating Returns in Excess of the Residential Real Estate Market 
This table presents evidence from regressions explaining price appreciation for repeat sales.  The 
sample consists of all properties sold between January 1990 and December 2010 with non-
missing data on sale price, sale date and down payment, sale prices more than $10,000 and sale 
prices less than $10,000,000.  The independent variables include binary variables indicating the 
two sale dates for the repeat sale.  Additional independent variables include a binary variable 
indicating the net all-cash purchases in the sale pair, the net foreclosure sales in the sale pair, 
variables indicating if the foreclosed property is between 5 and 15 years (Foreclose5) or older 
than 15 years (Foreclose15), if a flipper is buying the property (Flipper Discount), if a flipper is 
buying the property from someone who purchased with a LTV>0.90 (Flipper Discount90), if a 
flipper is buying the property from someone who purchased with a LTV>0.95 (Flipper 
Discount95), if a flipper is selling the property (Flipper Sale), if a non-flipper bought the 
property form a flipper (Flipper Premium), if a flipper is selling the property within one year of 
purchase (Flipper 1 Year Holding Period) and dummy variables indicating holding period (One 
Year,…, Five Years). 
  Estimate (eEstimate-1)x100% Std. Error T-Stat P Value 
Intercept 0.02534 2.57% 0.00197 12.85 <.0001 
One Year 0.06653 6.88% 0.00214 31.05 <.0001 
Two Years 0.01727 1.74% 0.00173 9.98 <.0001 
Three Years 0.00259 0.26% 0.00149 1.74 0.0821 
Four Years 0.00096 0.10% 0.00131 0.73 0.4652 
Five Years 0.00091 0.09% 0.00119 0.76 0.4465 
All-Cash 0.11455 12.14% 0.00092 124.07 <.0001 
Foreclose 0.18229 20.00% 0.00242 75.46 <.0001 
Foreclose5 0.01494 1.51% 0.0026 5.74 <.0001 
Foreclose15 0.12498 13.31% 0.00266 47 <.0001 
Flipper Discount -0.0802 -7.71% 0.00934 -8.59 <.0001 
Flipper Discount90 0.02151 2.17% 0.0189 1.14 0.2549 
Flipper Discount95 -0.0924 -8.83% 0.01271 -7.27 <.0001 
Flipper Sale 0.02603 2.64% 0.02056 1.27 0.2054 
Flip Sale6 0.14872 16.03% 0.02147 6.93 <.0001 
Flip Sale12 0.0994 10.45% 0.02423 4.1 <.0001 
Flipper Premium -0.0498 -4.86% 0.0096 -5.19 <.0001 
Observations 541,687 
R2 0.7755         
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Table V 
Estimating Returns in Excess of the Residential Real Estate Market 
Including Property Improvements 
This table presents evidence from regressions explaining price appreciation for repeat sales.  The 
sample consists of all properties sold between January 1990 and December 2010 with non-
missing data on sale price, sale date and down payment, sale prices more than $10,000 and sale 
prices less than $10,000,000.  The independent variables include binary variables indicating the 
two sale dates for the repeat sale.  Additional independent variables include a binary variable 
indicating the net all-cash purchases in the sale pair, the net foreclosure sales in the sale pair, 
variables indicating if the foreclosed property is between 5 and 15 years (Foreclose5) or older 
than 15 years (Foreclose15), if a flipper is buying the property (Flipper Discount), if a flipper is 
buying the property from someone who purchased with a LTV>0.90 (Flipper Discount90), if a 
flipper is buying the property from someone who purchased with a LTV>0.95 (Flipper 
Discount95), if a flipper is selling the property (Flipper Sale), if a non-flipper bought the 
property form a flipper (Flipper Premium), if a flipper is selling the property within one year of 
purchase (Flipper 1 Year Holding Period), dummy variables indicating holding period (One 
Year,…, Five Years) and a variable which indicates the change in property value from building 
permit (Remodel). 
  Estimate (eEstimate-1)x100% Std. Error T-Stat P Value 
Intercept 0.02629 2.66% 0.00363 7.25 <.0001 
One Year 0.08576 8.95% 0.00385 22.27 <.0001 
Two Years 0.02529 2.56% 0.00317 7.98 <.0001 
Three Years 0.0066 0.66% 0.00272 2.42 0.0154 
Four Years 0.00249 0.25% 0.00238 1.05 0.2953 
Five Years -0.0023 -0.23% 0.00216 -1.05 0.2919 
All-Cash 0.13905 14.92% 0.00173 80.44 <.0001 
Foreclose 0.18795 20.68% 0.00555 33.86 <.0001 
Foreclose5 0.02898 2.94% 0.00646 4.48 <.0001 
Foreclose15 0.17861 19.56% 0.00531 33.66 <.0001 
Flipper Discount -0.0758 -7.30% 0.01483 -5.11 <.0001 
Flipper Discount90 0.00104 0.10% 0.0291 0.04 0.9715 
Flipper Discount95 -0.1079 -10.23% 0.01989 -5.43 <.0001 
Flipper Sale 0.06129 6.32% 0.02951 2.08 0.0378 
Flip Sale6 0.08012 8.34% 0.03111 2.58 0.01 
Flip Sale12 0.05003 5.13% 0.03527 1.42 0.156 
Flipper Premium -0.0426 -4.17% 0.01378 -3.09 0.002 
Remodel 0.00754 0.76% 0.00033 22.97 <.0001 
Observations 205,105 
R2 0.7524         
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Table VI 
Impact of Flippers on Foreclosures 
 
This table shows evidence of the relationship between flipped houses and foreclosures between 
2004 and 2009. The sample consists of all flipper sales between 2004 and 2006 and all 
foreclosures between 2006 and 2009.  The estimated parameters from equations (6), (7) and (9) 
are displayed below. The dependent variable is the number of foreclosures in a subdivision 
between 2006 and 2009. The explanatory variables include the total number of houses in 
subdivision i, the turnover in housing between 2004 and 2006, the median house price between 
2004 and 2006 and the total number of flip sales. The column ‘Poisson’ uses a Poisson 
distribution with covariates to describe foreclosures. The column ‘Negative Binomial’ uses a 
negative binomial distribution with covariates to describe foreclosures. The columns ‘Zero-
Inflated Poisson’ and ‘Logit’ are the results from a Zero-Inflated Poisson model as described in 
Lambert (1992). Foreclosures in subdivision i are either zero with certainty or drawn from a 
Poisson distribution. The ‘Zero-Inflated Poisson’ column displays the coefficients when the 
foreclosures are drawn from the Poisson distribution. The ‘Logit’ column displays the 
coefficients for the logit model which determine the probability of a subdivision having zero 
foreclosures with certainty.  Standard errors are in brackets below the coefficients. 
 
  Poisson Negative Binomial Zero-Inflated Poisson Logit 
Intercept -0.4547*** -0.9186*** -0.2124*** 0.6176*** 
[0.0135] [0.0256] [0.0292] [0.1357] 
Houses 0.0180*** 0.0219*** 0.0164*** -0.0282*** 
[0.0001] [0.0003] [0.0003] [0.0018] 
Houses2 0.0001*** 0.0001*** -0.0002*** 0.0007*** 
[<0.0001] [1 E -5] [1 E -6] [0.0005] 
Turnover 1.7795*** 2.0871*** 1.6514*** -2.5046*** 
[0.0111] [0.0263] [0.0251] [0.1821] 
Median Price -0.1116*** -0.1054*** -0.0950*** 0.0830***
[0.0021] [0.0032] [0.0050] [0.0105] 
Flip Sales 0.1357*** 0.1664*** 0.1260*** -0.9242*** 
[0.0032] [0.0100] [0.0076] [0.1452] 
 
N Obs 11,939 11,939 11,939 11,939 
Non-Zero Obs 9,403 9,403 9,403 9,403 
Zero Obs 2,536 2,536 2,536 2,536 
Significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level is represented by ***, **and * respectively. 
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Table VII 
Price Appreciation and Return on Equity 
 
This table shows the median price appreciation and median return on equity for flipper sales.  
The return on equity is calculated with an interest rate of 6%.  Flippers sales are sorted by the 
LTV the flipper uses to purchase the property.  The median price appreciation is largest when the 
LTV = 0.00 and tends to decrease as the LTV increases.  The median return on equity is smallest 
for LTV = 0.00 and rises as the LTV increases. 
 
LTV Count Median Price Appreciation Median Return on Equity 
ANY 2,477 35.38% 36.65% 
LTV = 0.00 1,002 35.86% 35.86% 
LTV > 0 1,475 26.17% 158.66% 
0.00 < LTV < 0.80 200 27.13% 66.95% 
0.80 ≤ LTV < 0.90 242 26.49% 143.62% 
0.90 ≤ LTV < 0.95 260 24.86% 220.44% 
0.95 ≤ LTV < 0.99 450 25.33% 1101.20% 
LTV = 1.00 323 28.47% N / A 
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Table VIII 
 
The Number and Composition of Flipper Purchases and Sales by Year 
 
This table shows the number of flipper purchases by year, the percentage sold within one year 
and the percentage purchased at foreclosure between the years 2000 and 2009.  The second 
column shows the total number of repeat-sale purchases by flippers in the market while the third 
column shows the percentage of these purchases sold within one year of purchase.  The fourth 
columns shows the percentage of these purchases that were foreclosures.  The fifth column 
shows the median price appreciation for all properties sold. 
 
Purchase 
Year 
Observations Percent Flip 
Sales 
Percent Foreclosure 
Purchases 
Median Price 
Appreciation 
2000 86 89.33% 0.90% 25.52% 
2001 76 91.67% 1.00% 23.22% 
2002 114 86.11% 0.00% 31.18% 
2003 108 80.51% 0.00% 20.75% 
2004 295 89.80% 0.80% 22.94% 
2005 399 94.25% 0.40% 28.01% 
2006 101 85.37% 6.00% 26.42% 
2007 21 82.61% 27.30% 23.35% 
2008 202 87.97% 82.20% 30.71% 
2009 512 94.23% 83.00% 42.93% 
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Table IX 
 
Excess Returns for Flippers by Year of Purchase 
 
This table presents results from regressions explaining price appreciation for repeat sales.  The 
sample consists of all properties sold between 1998 and 2009 with non-missing data on sale 
price, sale date, down payment sale prices more than $10,000 and sale prices less than 
$10,000,000.  The independent variables include binary variables indicating the two sale dates 
for the repeat sale, the binary variables in Tables IV and V (unreported) and binary variables 
indicating in what year the flipper purchased the property (Purchase in 2000, Purchase in 2001, 
etc.). 
 
Variable Estimate (eEstimate-1)x100% Std. Err. T-Statistic P-Value
Purchase in 2000 -0.0209 -2.07% 0.02703 -0.77 0.4388 
Purchase in 2001 0.03898 3.97% 0.02531 1.54 0.1236 
Purchase in 2002 0.0247 2.50% 0.02225 1.11 0.2669 
Purchase in 2003 -0.0384 -3.76% 0.02023 -1.9 0.0579 
Purchase in 2004 -0.0601 -5.84% 0.01817 -3.31 0.0009 
Purchase in 2005 -0.0412 -4.04% 0.01936 -2.13 0.0333 
Purchase in 2006 0.00765 0.77% 0.02607 0.29 0.7691 
Purchase in 2007 0.14365 15.45% 0.04528 3.17 0.0015 
Purchase in 2008 0.19438 21.46% 0.02884 6.74 <.0001 
Purchase in 2009 0.15545 16.82% 0.02147 7.24 <.0001 
 
 
 
